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Newton does not explicitly discuss the notion of substance much and certainly does 
articulate his conception of substance in any detailed or systematic way.  In the face of this 
fact about Newton’s writings it might seem a misguided act of speculation to attempt to 
provide an account of Newton’s conception of substance.  Nevertheless, Newton’s 
conception of substance plays an important role in his thought.  Among other issues, 
Newton’s conception of substance is intimately connected to his claim that action at a 
distance is absurd and inconceivable, that God is omnipresent, that minds are spatially 
located, that matter is passive, and that space and time are not substances.  By getting clearer 
on Newton’s conception of substance, we can hope to have a better understanding of these 
claims and Newton’s reasons for asserting them.  Moreover, as I will argue in this paper, 
Newton’s conception of substance provides a particularly nice window into the empiricist 
underpinnings of Newton’s thought through its affinities with the conception of substance 
Locke develops in his Essay. 
The ultimate claim I will defend here is that on Newton’s conception of substance a 
substance can have only one power.  An immediate consequence, as we will see, is that 
gravity is not a power of bodies and so not a material force.  In order to defend my central 
interpretive thesis, however, there is much groundwork that must be laid.  I will begin by 
drawing out the connection between power and substance for Newton.  In doing so, and to 
help clarify the relation between power and substance, I will draw a parallel between 
Newton’s and Locke’s conceptions of substance (Part I).  Once we have the basics of 
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Newton’s conception of substance on the table, a particular problem will arise: Newton 
appears to claim that bodies have multiple powers but given the conception of substance 
developed, it isn’t clear how multiple powers can be powers of one substance (Part II).  
After considering the answer to this question offered by Stein (2002)—an interpretation of 
Newton’s conception of substance which is broadly in agreement with the one I develop in 
the first part of this paper—I will argue that Stein’s interpretation cannot be reconciled with 
Newton’s claims about gravity and distant action.  With Stein’s solution off the table, I will 
argue for what I call a minimalist interpretation of Newton’s conception of substance: given 
Newton’s Lockean approach to substance, a substance can only have one power (Part III).  
I.  Newton’s Conception of Substance 
 In this section I will give and motivate my interpretation of substance in Newton’s 
thought.  The main aim is to establish the following points: substance is power, that is, what 
is intelligible concerning substances are powers; activity is best thought of as interactivity, 
contrasting not with passivity but instead with influence on change in motion or thought; 
and finally, that Newton rejects a substratum view of substance.  The starting point for my 
interpretation is Newton’s discussion of the difference between space and body in De 
Gravitatione.  After announcing his main concern in De Gravitatione Newton begins by 
defining place, body, motion and rest. He then immediately notes that his definitions are at 
odds with their Cartesian counterparts and launches an extended attack to undermine the 
Cartesian status quo.  After taking on Descartes’ conceptions of motion and place, Newton 
targets what he sees as the rotten core of the Cartesian metaphysics of motion: the claim that 
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body is extension.1 To defeat the Cartesian conception of body, then, Newton argues that 
space and body must be distinguished.  In drawing this distinction between non-substantial 
space and substantial body, Newton reveals the central components of his conception of 
substance. As we proceed through the evidence of De Gravitatione, I will also draw on later 
works to show that this conception of substance survived into Newton’s later thought. 
 i.  Substance as activity 
Newton’s argument against the Cartesian identification of body and extension 
proceeds by giving an account of each such that their non-identity is evident.  An overview 
of this argument will be helpful for structuring my interpretation.  Newton begins with an 
account of space in which he argues against its substantiality.  Obviously, given that body is a 
substance, if space isn’t a substance, then body and space cannot be identical.  Having 
considered space, Newton goes on to give an account of the nature of body.  Newton argues 
that body includes more than extension from two different directions.  In his (famous) 
hypothetical creation story, Newton speculates as to what God might have added to empty 
space in creating body.  Less famously, Newton goes on to suggest that even following 
Descartes’ method for determining the essence of body—stripping or abstracting the merely 
sensible from body—does not leave extension alone.  We can now turn to the text of De 
                                                
1 That Newton thinks the last refuge for Cartesian metaphysics of motion in the wake of his 
attacks on Descartes’ definitions of motion and place is to be found in its account of body is 
evident in the following passage from De Gravitatione: “In addition, since Descartes…seems 
to have demonstrated that body does not differ at all from extension…and as this has been 
taken by many as proved, and is in my view the only reason for having confidence in this 
opinion, and less any doubt should remain about the nature of motion, I shall reply to this 
argument by saying what extension and body are, and how they differ from each other” 
(Newton, 21). 
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Gravitatione to highlight how each of these three anti-Cartesian arguments reveal the 
centrality of power in Newton’s conception of substance. 
We can begin with Newton’s arguments against the substantiality of space.  Of 
course, the precise status of space in Newton’s thought is a thorny issue—if it is neither 
attribute nor substance, what could it be?  Fortunately, given my limited aim of examining 
Newton’s conception of substance, we can set that issue aside and instead focus on 
Newton’s discussion of what counts against space’s substantiality.   Newton claims, “[Space] 
is not a substance: on the one hand, because it is not absolute in itself, but is as it were an 
emanative effect of God and an affection of every kind of being; on the other hand, because 
it is not among the proper affections that denote substance, namely actions, such as thoughts 
in the mind and motions in the body” (Newton, 21).  Since the first clause in this passage 
focuses on a more positive characterization of space as an, ‘as it were emanative effect’, I will 
focus on Newton’s other hand.  Newton immediately proceeds to draw out the connection 
between activity and substance: 
“For although philosophers do not define substance as an entity that can act upon 
things, yet everyone tacitly understands this of substances, as follows from the fact 
that they would readily allow extension to be a substance in the manner of body if 
only it were capable of motion and of sharing in the actions of body.  And on the 
contrary, they would hardly allow that body is substance if it could not move, nor 
excite any sensation or perception in any mind whatsoever” (Newton, 21-22). 
Newton here clearly ties the insubstantiality of space to its inability to act.  With respect to 
bodies this inaction is irrelevance in determining the motions of bodies.  With respect to 
minds, it is a matter of having no influence in determining the thoughts of minds by exciting 
sensations or perceptions in them.  In his subsequent exposition of space, Newton again 
highlights its irrelevance to determining the motions of bodies: “in space there is no force of 
any kind that might impede, assist, or in any way change the motions of bodies” (Newton 
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26).  So, Newton’s arguments against the substantiality of space suggest that substantiality 
requires activity, which, with respect to body, is influence on motion.  
The connection between substance and activity is also exhibited in the second phase 
of his anti-Cartesian argument, his account of body.  Newton begins his account by framing 
it in terms of a hypothetical creation story, “we can define bodies as determined quantities of 
extension which omnipresent God endows with certain conditions” (Newton, 28 original emphasis).  In 
spelling out the endowed ‘conditions’ it becomes evident that such conditions are powers:  
“(1) that they be mobile, and therefore I did not say that they are numerical parts of 
space which are absolutely immobile, but only definite quantities which may be 
transferred from space to space; (2) that two kinds of this kind cannot coincide 
anywhere, that is, that they may be impenetrable, and hence that oppositions 
obstruct their mutual motions and they are reflected in accord with certain laws; (3) 
that they can excite various perceptions of the senses and the imagination in created 
minds and conversely be moved by them, which is not surprising since the 
description of their origin is founded on this” (Newton, 28-29).2 
 God creates bodies by endowing regions of space with certain powers: the power to move, 
the power of impenetrability, and the powers of interacting with minds (exciting sensations 
and being moveable by acts of will).  Thus, in creating substantial bodies, God creates certain 
powers.  Again, then, the connection between substance and activity or power is evident. 
                                                
2 Newton’s final claim—‘which is not surprising since the description of their origin is 
founded on this’—seems to be a reference to his preface to the creation story in which he 
says we can understand God’s endowing regions of space as similar to our ability to move 
our bodies merely by acts of mind:  “Since each man is conscious that he can move his body 
at will, and believes further that other men enjoy the same power of similarly moving their 
bodies by thought alone, the free power of moving bodies at will can by no means be denied 
to God, whose faculty of thought is infinitely greater and more swift.  And for the same 
reason it must be agreed that God, by the sole action of thinking and willing, can prevent a 
body from penetrating any space defined by certain limits” (Newton, 27). 
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 The connection between substance and activity or power continues in the third of 
Newton’s arguments, his self-described ‘concise response’ to Descartes.3  Instead of 
considering what God could have added to extension to create body, Newton considers 
what remains when we strip all sensible qualities from body and end up with what Descartes 
would consider body’s essential qualities:  “let us abstract from body…all sensible qualities 
so that nothing remains except what pertains to its essence.  Will extension alone then 
remain?  By no means” (Newton 33-4).   Stripping body of its sensible qualities, leaving its 
essence we are not left with extension but (i) the powers of interacting with minds and (ii) 
the power of resistance.  Newton thinks the latter is evident in the motions of bodies in 
fluids.  After noting that different fluids provide different resistances to bodies passing 
through them, Newton claims, “if the subtle matter were deprived of all forces of resistance 
to the motion of globules, I should no longer believe it to be subtle matter but a scattered 
vacuum.  And so if there were any aerial or aetherial space of such a kind that it yielded 
without any resistance to the motions of comets or any projectiles, I should believe that it is 
utterly empty” (Newton 33).  Again, the connection between substance—body in this case—
and activity or power—‘resistance to the motion of globules’—is at the root of Newton’s 
distinction between non-substantial space and substantial body.  The absence of a power to 
alter the motions of bodies is the absence of substance. 
 ii.  Activity as interactivity 
The preceding discussion not only reveals an important connection between 
substance and activity or power for Newton.  It also provides insight into how ‘activity’ or 
‘power’ should be understood in the context of substance for Newton.  Perhaps most 
                                                
3 “Moreover, so that I may respond more concisely to Descartes’ argument…” (Newton 33). 
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important, the texts reveal that ‘activity’ and ‘power’ are not to be contrasted with passivity.  
Consider the last power examined above, the power of resistance Newton believes to remain 
after we abstract from body’s sensible qualities.  This power of resistance appears to be 
passive in the sense that a body must be acted upon before this power is manifest.  In similar 
fashion, one might worry that impenetrability is similarly passive—only when another body 
attempts to occupy another’s place will the impenetrability of each be manifest in the 
subsequent alteration of each body’s motion.  If we understand ‘power’ and ‘activity’ in this 
broad way, however, one might worry that even space may have some substance-making 
powers; the power, for example, to be filled or occupied. 
Fortunately, the texts we have already examined provide sufficient evidence to thread 
this needle. Substance-making powers are powers relevant to determining the motions of 
bodies and perceptions of minds.  This point is most evident in Newton’s argument against 
the substantiality of space (the first argument considered above) and his claim that a power 
of resistance remains in body even once we have abstracted away from its sensible qualities 
(the third, so-called ‘concise’, argument).  Taking the former first, recall that space is exhibits 
no activity, is impotent, according to Newton because it has no bearing on determining the 
motions of bodies or perceptions of minds.  Similarly, in defending his claim that a power of 
resisting motion remains in our conception of body even if we strip away from its sensible 
qualities, Newton insists that to strip away the power to resist the motion of other bodies is 
to finally eliminate body and leave only empty space.   
On the one hand, then, substance-making activity is not to be contrasted with 
passivity.  Since ‘power’ seems to me to more readily cover both ‘active’ and ‘passive’ 
powers, going forward I will only use that term. On the other hand, however, substance-
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making powers are robust enough such that that space does not qualify as a substance on the 
grounds that it has the capacity to be filled.  In short, then, Newton’s conception of 
substance places interactive powers are at the heart of substantiality: at least in the non-divine 
cases, substance-making powers are powers of interaction, powers to change motions of 
bodies and thoughts of minds. 
As I noted above, two of the three sets of texts previously considered neatly support 
the claim that substance-constituting powers are powers of interaction.  One might worry, 
however, that not all of the powers given in the other text, Newton’s hypothetical creation 
story, offer such support.  In particular, one might worry about whether one of the powers 
added to space to get body is a power of interaction at all: namely, the power of mobility.  
At first glance the condition of mobility does not look like an interactive power since 
we can understand it as an ability to change place.  Of course, by moving, one thing may 
effect the movement of something else, but it isn’t clear how mobility is itself an interactive 
power.  If mobility is not itself a power of interaction, then it cannot on my interpretation 
constitute a substance.  But in laying out how God might have created body, Newton seems 
to suggest that mobility is a substance-making power of body.  If correct, this would 
seriously undermine my interpretation.  Fortunately, however, that there is a difficulty in 
understanding what it is to endow a region of space with mobility and so this prima facie 
understanding of mobility must go and its proper replacement is more obviously an 
interactive power. 
The issue is this: the creation story is a story of what God might do to a region of 
space to create body.  In this context, ‘space’ refers to the conception of absolute space that 
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Newton has developed in the immediately preceding pages of De Gravitatione.4  Of course, if 
the parts or regions of space are not themselves moveable as Newton states in his account of 
space (Newton, 25), then it isn’t clear in what sense a part of space can be endowed with 
mobility.  Indeed, it is difficult to understand how a region of absolute space could move at 
all since, by Newton’s own lights, for it to move would be for it to become a different region 
of space (Newton, 25).5  Thus, a straightforward understanding of the power of mobility as a 
power to change place endowed to a region of space is not acceptable because parts of space 
cannot change place without loss of identity.  We need a different approach to the power of 
mobility.   
The following seems a promising candidate: the mobility of body is the mobility of 
body’s other substance-making powers, such as impenetrability.  The important lesson for 
addressing the interactivity of mobility is that mobility is not a fundamental power of bodies 
in the same way that impenetrability and mind-interactivity are since mobility is not 
something that can be added to a region of space itself.  Thus, the substance of body is not, 
at root, constituted by a power of mobility.  However plausible this account may be, it raises 
the question of how to understand the mobility of bodies, fundamental or not.  I suggest 
that the answer to this question is that there is no discrete power of mobility for Newton.  
Rather there are particular power(s) of motion, that is, powers of moving in certain ways.  
The power of mobility is nothing but the exercise of these powers. 
                                                
4 That Newton is concerned with absolute space in his account of the nature of space seems 
to be evident in his claims about it: it is infinite (Newton, 23), its parts are motionless (25), 
“the positions, distances, and local motions of bodies are to be referred to the parts of 
space” (26), and finally, space is “eternal in duration and immutable in nature because it is 
the emanative effect of an eternal and immutable being” (26). 
5 Newton makes this point himself in the definitions at the beginning of the Principia (add 
citation). 
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To clarify this point and see some of its textual basis, we can consider some reasons 
why impenetrability might not seem like a fundamentally interactive power.  As in the case 
of motion, it seems clear that if a body is impenetrable that impenetrability will effect the 
movement of other bodies.  However, as also in the case of motion, we seem to have a grasp 
on impenetrability that is independent of the motions of other bodies: bodies are 
impenetrable in that no two bodies can occupy the same place. In Newton’s hands, however, 
this characterization of impenetrability yields to an explicitly interactive conception: “that 
two of this kind cannot coincide anywhere, that is, that they may be impenetrable, and hence 
that oppositions obstruct their mutual motions and they are reflected in accord with certain 
laws” (Newton, 28).  This suggests that substance-making power of impenetrability be 
understood as that power which determines how bodies move when ‘attempting’ to occupy 
the place of another body.  I propose to understand the ‘conclusion’ of the above passage 
(‘and hence…’) as articulating the non-coincidence of bodies rather than describing the 
effect of impenetrability.  The impenetrability of bodies consists in the motion that results 
from their attempting to occupy each other’s space, as characterized by the laws governing 
these motions.6,7  Further support of this interpretive point will come shortly as I defend the 
                                                
6 One might worry that impenetrability can be understood through a variety of different laws 
of reflection.  On one possible scenario, two things brought into contact may simply stop 
and stay in contact.  On another, they move away from each other.  In each case, however, 
there is impenetrability.  Thus impenetrability is more than the laws relevant to the reflection 
of bodies.  The appropriate reply, I believe, is similar to the move I made above with respect 
to the relation between the power of mobility in general and the powers of moving in 
particular ways: we can form a general understanding of impenetrability as a generalization 
from the varieties of reflection.  This move, however, is admittedly far removed from any of 
Newton’s own writings. 
7 Schliesser (MS) also contains the suggestion the power or force of impenetrability be 
understood as a power or force of moving in certain ways and so characterized by certain 
laws.  Schliesser’s interpretation of the conditions of Newton’s creation story, emphasis 
added: “That is to say, the ‘nature-engendering nature’ of bodies is not God’s will, but 
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claim that substance-making powers are made intelligible to us through laws of motion.  For 
now, however, we can return to the issue of how to understand the power of mobility as an 
interactive power. 
 According to the suggestion above, the power of impenetrability just is a power of 
moving in certain ways upon impact with another body.  Thus, if impenetrability were the 
only power of motion, impenetrability would exhaust body’s power of mobility and the two 
could be identified. That is, the power of mobility would be nothing more than the power of 
impenetrability; or, the exercise of the power of mobility would be understood as nothing 
more than the exercise of the power of impenetrability.8  At metaphysical root, then, would 
be the power of impenetrability (or other particular powers of motion), an interactive power 
of bodies by which their motions are determined.   
iii.  Newton, Locke and the intelligibility of substance and power 
At this point it will be helpful to turn to Locke’s treatment of substance to help 
clarify the connection between powers and substance in Newton.  So far we have seen that 
interactive powers are at the heart of Newton’s conception of substance. In this respect 
there is a strong, and, I believe, illuminating parallel between Newton and Locke on 
substance.  By turning to Locke on substance I hope to flesh out the relation between power 
and substance in Newton that I have so far sketched.  Specifically, the point I want to make 
is that on Newton’s conception of substance, what is intelligible to us concerning substance 
are interactive powers; our knowledge of substance is knowledge of powers. 
                                                
(presumably) the essential qualities of body, e.g., i) mobility; ii) impenetrability, which Newton 
articulates in terms of law-like behavior in collision; and iii)…” (Schliesser, 8). 
8 As we will see in sections II and III below, when gravity comes prominently on the scene 
in Principia, this story gets more complicated since one might worry that if gravitational 
attraction is a principle of the mobility of bodies, bodies will act distantly. 
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Working within the framework of a theory of ideas, Locke approaches substance 
through our idea of substance.  According to Locke, our ideas of substance are complex 
ideas formed by the mind from the simple ideas it receives in sensation and reflection. We 
form ideas of substances when we notice certain ideas constantly going together (cite 2.23.x).  
Complex ideas of substance are unique among complex ideas in that their construction 
involves combining the constantly conjoined ideas with the idea of some kind of support.  
Most important for my purpose here, however, is that, according to Locke, the ideas which 
go into our ideas of substances are for the most part ideas of powers and so our ideas of 
substances are almost entirely composed of ideas of powers (2.23.8-10, 37).  In the first place 
these powers are sensible qualities, powers to produce ideas in us (these includes both 
primary and secondary qualities) (cite 2.21.x).  In the second and no less important place, the 
powers of substances are powers to produce and undergo changes in sensible qualities 
through interacting with other substances (cite 2.21.x).  And as in Newton the powers of a 
substance are both passive and active powers (2.21.2).  Moreover, the ideas of the powers 
which make up the majority of our ideas of substance are also complex ideas, strictly 
speaking; they are, presumably, ideas of modes or perhaps relations (2.21.3, 2.23.7). These 
complex ideas of powers have as an essential ingredient the simple idea of power, which is 
the topic of Essay 2.21.  Since ideas of substances are complex ideas mostly composed of 
ideas of powers, and such ideas of powers all have as an essential component the simple idea 
of power, it is no surprise that Locke claims that the idea of power is ‘a principal Ingredient’ 
in our ideas of substances (2.21.3/234).   
As noted, however, Locke also claims that there is more to our ideas of substances 
than ideas of powers; namely, an obscure, relative idea of support for the substance’s 
powers.  Similarly, the texts for Locke may also suggest that some of the simple ideas that go 
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into our complex ideas of substances are ideas of primary qualities.  Insofar as primary 
qualities are something more than powers to produce ideas in us, our ideas of substances 
consist in more than ideas of mere powers.  These two aspects of Locke’s thought on 
substance—what to make of ‘support’ or substratum, and what to make of the distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities—are notoriously difficult.  For my purpose of 
drawing a parallel between Locke and Newton, however, we can set aside these thorny 
issues. I want to draw attention to the following point: in addressing substance through the 
theory of ideas, we can understand Locke’s claims about substance in the following way.  His 
account of substance vis-à-vis our complex idea of substance is an account of what is 
intelligible to us when it comes to substance.  And for the most part—perhaps for the whole 
part, depending on interpretation—what is intelligible to us in substance are powers. Our 
grasp on substances (even our own substance, our own mind) does not penetrate beyond the 
powers of substance to affect us (our own mind appears to itself through ideas of reflection) 
or other substances. 
I suggest that Newton’s conception of substance should be understood in similar 
vein.  That is, the connection between substance and power I have developed thus far 
concerns what is intelligible to us concerning substances.  For Newton, what we grasp 
concerning substances are their powers; namely, powers relevant to determining the motions 
of bodies and perceptions of minds.  One of the final passages in De Gravitatione’s argument 
against Cartesian body contains an important passage supporting this suggestion.  Ending 
the ‘concise’ anti-Cartesian argument, Newton concludes: “thus, you see how fallacious and 
unsound this Cartesian argumentation is, for when the accidents of bodies have been 
rejected, there remains not extension alone, as he supposed, but also the capacities by which 
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they can stimulate perceptions in the mind by the means of various bodies” (Newton, 35).9  
The phrase of interest in this passage is ‘stimulate perceptions in the mind by the means of 
various bodies’.  Given the interpretation of substance developed thus far, the following 
interpretation of the phrase suggests itself: the phrase is a reference to the alterations in 
motions bodies create in one another through their interaction.  This interaction, the 
alteration in motions of bodies, is our access to substance-making powers as the 
manifestation or exercise of such powers.  This epistemology also appears in Newton’s 
preface to the first edition of the Principia: “For the basic problem of philosophy seems to be 
to discover the forces of nature from the phenomena of motions and then to demonstrate 
the other phenomena from these forces” (Newton, 41).  And in the General Scholium 
Newton says the following concerning substance: “We see only the shapes and colors of 
bodies, hear only their sounds, we touch only their external surfaces, we smell only their 
odors, and we taste their flavors.  But there is no direct sense and there are no indirect 
reflected actions by which we know innermost substances.” (Newton, 89).  In this last 
passage, Newton expresses the thoroughly empiricist position that our only access to the 
                                                
9 Indeed, Schliesser (MS) gives a similarly epistemic interpretation of this passage.  Schliesser 
suggests that according to Newton we come to know bodies, indeed any substance 
whatsoever, by measurement.  He writes: 
“Newton insists against Descartes that bodies must also have ‘the capacities’ to 
‘stimulate perceptions in the mind by means of various bodies’.  For a body to be a 
body in the mechanical substances it must be susceptible to measurement…What is 
true of body is true of all entities: they must have the ability to be perceived by minds 
by means of other bodies, that is, by rods…and by timekeepers.” (12)   
On Schliesser’s interpretation we come to know individual substances by measuring them in 
space and time.  Measuring devices are the ‘other bodies’ perceived in conjunction with the 
to-be-known-bodies.  While this interpretation is not obviously incompatible with Newton’s 
claims, it does seem something of a stretch as an interpretation of ‘by means of’.  At the very 
least, I believe that the interpretation I offer fits better and perhaps comprehends 
Schliesser’s. 
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world around us is through appearance.  As a result, our grasp of the world is limited to what 
we can make of it through appearances.  Combining these passages with the interpretation 
of Newtonian substance so far developed, the following picture presents itself.  Our grasp of 
substances beyond10 our sensory interactions is limited to the motions of bodies and so 
consists in nothing more than such powers of motion. 
For Locke, what is intelligible in substance are powers to produce ideas in us, whether 
immediately by producing ideas in us or mediately by altering the sensible qualities of other 
substances.  Our knowledge of these powers, however, does not penetrate any further than 
an apprehension of them as powers to produce ideas.  Though he is not working within a 
theory of ideas, I hope to have shown that a similar point holds for Newton.  We know 
substance-making powers through the motions that we observe.  Our grasp of substances 
consists in our access to the powers of altering motion manifest in the motions of bodies 
and goes no further.  As in Locke in which our ideas of substance consists in powers to 
produce ideas, for Newton our grasp of substance consists in nothing other than powers to 
affect motion.   Thus, substances are intelligible to us insofar as powers of motion are 
rendered intelligible.  This raises the question: how are powers rendered intelligible? Given 
that motion is our window into substance-making powers, it seems fair to conclude that it is 
through the formulation of laws of motion that such powers are themselves apprehended.   
Stein (2002) has argued for a similar position on the relation between Newtonian 
substance and laws in great detail. He points out that Newton, in Query 31 of the Opticks, 
“makes the explicit distinction, among natural powers or forces of nature, between the vis 
                                                
10 Such grasp goes ‘beyond’ sensory appearances only in that it is more general, applying to 
body whether perceivable or not, and abstract, independent of any particular sensory 
appearance.  
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inertiae, as a ‘passive principle,’ and the other forces, which are ‘active principles’; but in both 
cases, he makes clear, what characterizes or identifies a particular such force is a law of 
nature” (Stein, 289).11  Putting this point together with the De Gravitione creation story, Stein 
proposes that Newton has made a dramatic departure from past metaphysics by replacing 
substantial forms with laws of nature such that things are constituted by laws of nature:  
“We have, then…the indication that these principles, forces, or laws, are taken not to 
result from something like Aristotelian ‘substantial forms,’ which are ‘occult Qualities,’ 
but to replace them: it is by these ‘general Laws of Nature’ that ‘the Things themselves are 
form’d’—just as, in ‘De gravitatione,’ the clear attributes of impenetrability through the 
parts of space replaced the obscure notions of substance and substantial forms” (Stein, 
290). 
As should be evident, I am in broad agreement with Stein’s interpretation in taking the 
powers characterized by various laws to be substantial bedrock for Newton.  In the next 
section of the paper, I will further consider Stein’s view with an eye towards developing 
important differences between our interpretations. 
iv.  Space and inherence 
Before moving on to examine Stein’s interpretation, however, we need to have one 
more piece of Newton’s conception of substance on the table.  Treating substance-making 
powers as substantial bedrock brings us to an important point concerning substance on 
which Newton is very explicit: the notion of a subject of inherence is unintelligible.  That is, 
substance-making powers are not powers that inhere in anything or that are in need of any 
existential support, for Newton. The following passage from De Gravitatione is decisive: “And 
so substantial reality is to be ascribed to these kinds of attributes, which are real and 
                                                
11 Stein is careful to note that in the case of inertia, what “Newton regards as the law or 
principle characterizing the intrinsic force of matter as a natural power, not what we call the 
‘law of inertia,’ but the conjunction of all three Laws of Motion’ (Stein, 289). 
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intelligible things in themselves and do not need to be inherent in a subject, rather [ascribed] 
than to the subject which we cannot conceive as dependent, much less form any idea of it” 
(Newton, 32).  So, the fundamental constituent of substance just is its power(s), there is no 
need for the powers to inhere in anything.  Attributes in space and time are all there is to 
substance for Newton.  Newton goes on to develop this point in his numbered exposition of 
body (Newton, 29-30).  For example, the creation story shows that, “for the existence of 
[bodies] it is not necessary that we suppose some unintelligible substance to exist in which as 
subject there were an inherent substantial form; extension and an act of the divine will are 
enough” (Newton, 29).  The metaphysical picture Newton develops here is one that 
banishes the notion of subject or substantial support.  Instead all that there is to substance 
are powers in space and time. 
While it is clear that Newton rejects the necessity or intelligibility of a subject of 
inherence when it comes to substance, the ramifications of this rejection must be carefully 
considered to understand Newton’s conception of substance.  For example, one way to 
make sense of one substance having multiple qualities is through common inherence: the 
qualities all inhere in the same subject or substratum.  Indeed, as we saw above with Locke, 
though he allows only an obscure and relative idea of substratum or substance in general, he 
does insist that our ideas of substance in part consist in such an idea of support.  The 
passage from Stein quoted above suggests that space is supposed to take over the role of 
subject of inherence for Newton just as powers or laws of motion take over the role of 
substantial form in traditional metaphysics.  In the remainder of this paper I will further 
develop the form this question takes in light of what we have already seen of Newton’s 
conception of substance and then consider Stein’s interpretation of Newton’s answer to that 
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question.  After arguing that Stein’s interpretation falls short in certain important respects, I 
will propose my own solution. 
To close this section, however, we can summarize Newton’s conception of 
substance as so far interpreted.  First, substance and power are tightly linked: taking our lead 
from Locke and the parallels between Locke and Newton on substance and power, what is 
intelligible concerning substance are powers.  Second, these powers are ‘interactive’, that is 
substance-making powers can be both active and passive; what makes a power a substance-
making power is that it determines the motions of bodies (and/or perceptions of minds).  
Third, these powers are themselves rendered intelligible through the formulation of laws of 
motion.  Finally, these powers need not inhere in a metaphysically deeper subject which 
offers the powers existential support.  Powers need only exist in space and time       
II.  Putting substance together again and distant action 
i.  One thing many powers 
To begin, we can translate the problem raised at the end of the previous section into 
the context of the interpretation of Newtonian substance I have so far developed.  Having 
rejected any notion of substratum in which distinct qualities inhere in a single subject, it isn’t 
clear how a Newtonian substance could possess multiple qualities.  In this specific context, 
however, in which we have seen the centrality of power to Newtonian substance, this 
question becomes: how are different powers tied together into one substance given that he 
rejects the intelligibility of substratum?  The seeds for this problem can be seen in De 
Gravitatione but they come to full bloom in the Principia.  Consider two of the powers 
attributed to body in De Gravitatione: the power of impenetrability, listed in Newton’s 
creation story, and the power of resistance, which Newton attributes to body in his ‘concise’ 
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anti-Cartesian argument.  It appears that we have here two powers, of resistance and of 
impenetrability.  Suppose that these are distinct powers.12  If the substance of body is its 
powers, and there is no unifying subject of inherence, we can wonder: by virtue of what are 
these powers the powers of one substance, namely, body? More generally, by virtue of what 
are some powers unified into a singe substance?  Call this the power unification problem.   
ii.  Avoiding the problem through power maximalism 
 As we saw above, in claiming that space takes the place of substratum and that 
powers characterized by laws take the place of form in Newton’s conception of substance, 
Stein’s interpretation offers a solution.  Given that Newton replaces substratum with space, 
it seems that common inherence of qualities in a substratum is replaced by the co-location of 
powers in space.  So, for two powers to be powers of the same substance is for them to be 
located at the same place.  One prima facie difficulty for such an interpretation is that 
Newton famously allows that minds and God are located in space.13  Newton also insists that 
minds, bodies and God are distinct substances.  So, given that minds and bodies can be co-
located but really distinct, the unification of powers into powers of a single body must be 
understood in some other fashion than mere co-location.  One way this might be achieved is 
if powers of mind and body are sorted on an a priori basis.  If we have that a priori division, 
we can then allow that all powers grasped through laws of motion are powers of body, and 
such powers are thought to be powers of the same body by virtue of their co-location. 
                                                
12 Ultimately I will argue that these are the same power in Newton’s eyes by the Principia, but 
the problem can be raised using gravity and inertia. 
13 From De Gravitatione: “God is everywhere, created minds are somewhere, and body is in 
the space that it occupies; and whatever is neither everywhere nor anywhere does not exist” 
(Newton 25). 
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The grounds for such an interpretation might be found in De Gravitatione as Newton, 
despite challenging the Cartesian notion of body, seems to accept Cartesian dualism. Before 
beginning his argument against Descartes’ identification of body and extension Newton 
makes the following remark: “Since the distinction of substances into thinking and 
extended…is the principal foundation of Cartesian philosophy…I consider it most 
important to overthrow [that philosophy] as regards extension, in order to lay truer foundations 
of the mechanical sciences” (Newton, 21, emphasis added). Newton’s claim here is not that 
Descartes is wrong to divide the world into mental and material, but rather that he is wrong 
to take the material to be nothing but extension and so take extension as the exclusive 
province of one half of the mind-body divide. Thus, Newton seems to allow that powers can 
be sorted, a priori, into mental and material powers.  The same general principle described 
above about substance consisting in activity would hold, we just now recognize that all non-
mental (and non-divine) activity is material activity.  If this is the case then any laws of 
motion deliver us powers body.  Call this a maximalist approach to the powers of body as it 
assigns to body all those powers grasped through laws of motion.  
Stein’s maximalism is evident in his treatment of the change in Newton’s thought 
motivated by the discoveries of the Principia.  According to Stein, the change was profound: 
it “led Newton to a quite new conception of the nature of what Descartes had called ‘a 
natural power in general’; that is, to a new conception of how it may be fruitful…to conceive 
of the ‘actions’ that characterize nature” (Stein, 282).  Newton re-conceives the actions that 
characterize nature by thinking of them in terms of “principles governing forces of attraction and 
repulsion—themselves to be discovered by reasoning from the phenomena” (Stein, 283).  
After examining how this shift manifests itself in Newton’s definitions of force and their 
commentary, especially concerning centripetal force and its quantities, Stein concludes that 
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the shift results in the addition of fields of force to Newton’s metaphysics of body (Stein, 
287).   Putting this development in terms of the De Gravitatione creation story, Stein 
concludes that Newton’s mature metaphysics of body holds that, “in creating a body, 
God…must impose, not only the field of impenetrability and the laws of motion appropriate 
thereto, but other fields as well, with their laws, characterizing forces of interaction of the 
kind that have been described” (Stein, 289). Substance-making powers are understood as 
fields, grasped through their respective laws, which determine the motion of bodies.  Stein’s 
maximalism is evident in the phrase ‘in creating a body’.  Body is created by creating these 
distinct fields; that is, the substantiality of body consists in these existence of certain fields 
(or to use my, perhaps more neutral terminology, powers). 
Stein’s maximalism is also manifest in his interpretation of Newton’s denial that 
gravity is essential to body (perhaps most famously in a letter to Bentley). According to 
Stein, Newton denies that he is committed to the essentiality of gravity because for Newton 
discovering laws of nature is discovering candidate fundamental powers of body.   We can 
never be sure whether the motions attributed to a power, such as gravity, will be shown to 
be nothing over and above the operation of some other power, or whether any two (or 
three, etc.) powers will be shown to be the operation of another: “it will be a question for 
the future whether (yet deeper) causes of these principles may remain to be found out” (Stein, 
291).  The important presumption underlying this interpretation is that gravitational 
attraction is certainly a power of body.  The only open question is whether it is fundamental. 
So, Stein’s maximalist approach is evident in two ways.  On the one hand, Stein’s 
interpretation holds that any power characterized by laws of motion is a power of body.  On 
the other hand, Stein understands Newton’s denial that gravity is an inherent power of body 
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as a manifestation of epistemic modesty concerning the fundamentality of gravity. What is not 
open on Stein’s interpretation is that laws derived from the motions of bodies characterize 
powers that aren’t powers of bodies. 
 Having seen that Stein is a maximalist about the powers of body, we can now 
examine how this maximalism blocks the power unification problem.  The predominant 
theme of Stein’s interpretation is that Newton’s metaphysics transforms traditional 
metaphysics of matter and form into an intelligible metaphysics of fields in space.  
According to the tradition of substance against which Newton is reacting, we are faced with 
two questions in our thought about substance: “(1) In what do the qualities we attribute to a 
substance exist together? (2) What is the cause of their existing thus together?” (Stein, 278).  We 
can understand Newton’s answers to (1) and (2), according to Stein, by returning to the 
creation story of body (Stein, 278): the answer to (1) is that the attributes exist in space, but 
that is not to say that space offers some mysterious substantial support to the attributes; the 
answer to (2) is explicit in the creation story—attributes exist together simply in the sense 
that they coexist in the same place.  So, there need not be some further substantial form 
from which those powers flow, nor prime matter in which they all exist and are bundled into 
a body; existence in the same place accounts for the unity of powers into one substance.   
As noted above, however, all substances occupy some (or all space), and so 
substances can be in the same place.  Thus, it seems that a spatial criterion cannot be 
Newton’s solution to the power unification problem because distinct substances can exist in 
the same place.  It is exactly at this point, however, that Stein’s maximalism helps since it 
allows for an a priori division of the world into mind and body according to which powers 
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of the latter are known by the laws formulated in studying of motions of bodies.14  The 
powers grasped through the motions of bodies are, and can only be, powers of body and so 
the power unification problem is deflated.  Though an appealing solution, I will next argue 
that maximalism runs into important interpretive difficulties.  If maximalism is off the table, 
then so is its simple spatial unification principle and the power unification problem returns. 
 iii.  Distant action and essential gravity 
 In a letter to Bentley, Newton makes perhaps his most famous denial concerning 
gravity and action at a distance:  
“It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of 
something else, which is not material, operate upon and affect other matter without 
mutual contact, as it must be, if gravitation in the sense of Epicurus, be essential and 
inherent in it.  And this is one reason why I desired you would not ascribe innate gravity to me.  
That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may 
act upon another at a distance through a vacuum without the mediation of anything 
else, and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to 
another, is to me so great an absurdity, that I believe no man who has in 
philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it.” (Newton 
102-3, emphasis added). 
The point I want to draw from this passage is that (one reason) Newton denies gravity to be 
innate, inherent, or essential to matter is because such a status implies that matter acts 
distantly.  Given the obvious absurdity of action at a distance, ‘innate’ gravity is likewise 
absurd.15  Newton’s worry seems to be that if gravity is innate (etc.) in body then the bodies 
themselves will be doing the gravitating, they will themselves be responsible for the 
                                                
14 To further appreciate how Stein’s maximalism allows for a metaphysically deflationary 
answer to this (same place), consider that even answering (2) with ‘God’s will’ does not shed 
much light on the issue without an account of what the unification of powers amounts to.  
Even if we read ‘cause’ in (2) as formal cause, what is God willing when God wills some 
powers be together? 
15 One may wonder why Newton takes action at a distance to be so absurd.  Does he take it 
as a primitive metaphysical principle?  Is it derived from something else?  If I am right about 
substance it seems to fall out of his conception of substance. 
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gravitational attraction between them.  The problem for maximalism, it seems to me, is that 
it is not able to explain how denying the innateness of gravity will allow Newton to avoid the 
charge of action at a distance.  To see this, we can begin by sorting out different senses of 
innate, whether gravity being innate in that sense entails distant action, and finally to which 
of these senses of ‘innate’ maximalism may appeal. 
 One way to understand the innateness of gravity is to emphasize Newton’s use of 
‘essential’ and so to take it to mean that without gravitational attraction body would not 
exist.  The De Gravitatione creation story again provides interpretive help: if God did not 
create the power of gravitational attraction God would not have created something 
indistinguishable from matter, just as if had God created mind-interactivity but not solidity, 
what was created would be distinguishable from matter.  Though a relatively straightforward 
sense of innate, it isn’t quite clear (to me, anyhow) whether gravity’s being innate in this 
sense would entail action at a distance. And so denying the innateness of gravity in this sense 
seems to have no bearing on whether Newton is rightly charged with positing distant action. 
 Another way to understand Newton’s denial of gravity’s innateness is as suggested by 
Stein—gravity is not a fundamental power of bodies.  What is important in this context, 
however, is that the non-fundamentality of gravity allow Newton to escape a commitment to 
distant action.  On this front, however, I believe that maximalism fails on account of running 
into the following trilemma.   
In the first place, gravity could be non-fundamental in the sense that the movements 
associated with gravitational attraction could be understood as the operation of another 
power of body, say, its impenetrability.  A vortical account of gravity would be an example 
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of the non-fundamentality of gravity in this sense.  Newton, however, strongly and 
consistently denies that any vortical (or other impact-based) theory is up to this task.16   
A second way in which gravity could be non-fundamental is that it is perhaps super-
added (in a Lockean sense) to bodies.  Under this scenario God could create something 
indistinguishable from matter without creating gravitational attraction and so in creating 
body would not therein create gravitational attraction.  The problem for this approach, 
however, is that even if gravity is not innate in this sense, such non-innate gravity still 
implicates distant action.  The superadded attractive powers are still acting distantly.17   
A third way in which gravity might be non-fundamental to body is that while the 
attraction is sensitive to features of bodies (their mass and distance), the attractive force is 
communicated by a medium distinct from the bodies themselves.  Gravity would be non-
fundamental to body in the sense that the attraction can change without the bodies 
themselves changing since the operation of the medium could be leaned on to explain the 
difference in attraction. Of course, for reasons similar to those at the heart of Newton’s 
resistance to a vortical account, this medium cannot operate through impact.  But then it 
isn’t clear that the medium could be material in the sense of being constituted, at least in 
part, by the power of impenetrability.  If, for example, atomic particles are massy, as Newton 
suggests, then they exert gravitational attraction on other bodies.  But given their atomic 
nature they cannot be permeated by a material medium, and so no material medium can 
account for the gravitational attraction (among atomic bodies at least).   A non-material 
                                                
16 Janiak (2007) contains a thorough discussion of this point under the heading of addressing 
the ‘reality’ of the gravitational force for Newton.  See as well the General Scholium to Book 
III for Newton’s rejection of vortical accounts of gravitational attraction. 
17 Either that or this option collapses into the vortical option likewise fails Newton’s texts. 
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medium, however, is not open to the maximalist, since such a medium is a non-mental, non-
material entity (that is neither space nor time) in a world that the maximalist must divide a 
priori into mind and matter if she is to defend the spatial criterion of co-existence.   
Thus, none of the three options for understanding the non-fundamentality of gravity 
is compatible with maximalism.  Moreover, it seems that the ‘non-fundamental’ reading is 
the only option available to the maximalist for making sense of Newton’s denial in the letter 
to Bentley. What, if not something like ‘not fundamental’, could the non-innateness of 
gravity amount to if all powers grasped through laws of motion are powers of body? Thus, 
Stein’s interpretation, and maximalism more generally, cannot properly account for 
Newton’s thought on innateness and distant action.  If maximalism and its spatial criterion 
of power unification are not tenable, however, the power unification problem presses again. 
Finally, given the interpretation of substance developed so far, it should be evident that the 
maximalist cannot lightly dismiss Newton’s denial of distant action.  As I have shown, the 
link between action and substance is at the core of Newton’s thought on substance; not even 
God acts distantly according Newton.18 
In the end, then, recourse to an a priori dualism cannot save the maximalist 
interpretation of the power unification problem.  Maximalism cannot make proper sense of 
Newton’s denial of distant action because it cannot make sense of the relation between 
gravity and body such that gravitational attraction does not imply the distant action of bodies 
on one another.  At best the maximalist can offer that gravity is a non-fundamental power of 
bodies, but I have argued that the senses of non-fundamental acceptable to Newton and 
                                                
18 God is not merely virtually omni-present, but substantially omni-present: “[God] is 
omnipresent not only virtually but also substantially; for action requires substance.” (Newton, 
91). 
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open to the maximalist (given its required a priori dualism) still imply that bodies act 
distantly.  
III.  Power minimalism 
The possibility of making out a coherent conception of substance in Newton’s 
thought looks dim.  The most straightforward answer to the power unification problem—
maximalism—does not seem to respect Newton’s thought in importantly substance-related 
area of distant action.  While the situation is bleak, it is not without hope.  An important 
assumption behind both maximalism and pessimism about solving the power unification 
problem, indeed an assumption behind the power unification problem itself, is that distinct 
powers need to be unified; that substances have distinct powers.  I propose what I will call 
power minimalism.  Minimalism falls neatly out of the conception of substance described in 
part I: if substance is activity in space and time, then a power just is a substance, a unit. 
According to minimalism there is no need for an account of the unity of powers into a 
substance and so Newton’s claim that minds are located in space does not threaten to 
conflict with his a priori dualism by positing a spatial criterion of co-existence.  Nor, of 
course need we follow maximalism in taking such dualism as prior to a spatial criterion of 
power unificiation. Minimalism therefore fits comfortably with Newton’s claim that different 
substances can be present in the same place.   
While the upside of minimalsim is clear, the roadblock to minimalism, and so to a 
coherent picture of substance in Newton’s thought, is equally clear: bodies seem to have 
multiple powers even once we’ve abstracted away from their sensory appearances.  In the 
next section I will attempt to show how this apparent diversity can be rendered merely 
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apparent (or at least, that minimalism and hence coherent Newtonian metaphysics depend 
on this). 
 i.  The multiple qualities of body 
In several places Newton appears to straightforwardly claim that bodies have more 
than one power.  De Gravitatione is one such place.  In the creation story Newton claims that 
in creating body God must endow regions of space with several conditions.  Later Newton 
appears to attribute another power to body not considered in the creation story: that of 
resistance to the motion of other bodies.  Moreover, in later work, Newton twice gives lists 
that attribute multiple qualities to bodies.  In the elaboration (justification?) of Rule 3 of the 
Principia’s Rules for doing Philosophy, Newton notes: “and thus we conclude that every one 
of the least parts of all bodies is extended, hard, impenetrable, moveable and endowed with a 
force of inertia” (Newton, 88).  Another similar list appears in Query 31 to the Opticks: “it 
seems probable to me, that God in the beginning formed matter in solid, massy, hard 
impenetrable, moveable particles” (Newton, 136).  In each of these lists Newton apparently 
holds that bodies have many qualities, and so minimalism apparently fails Newton’s texts.  
 A first step in minimalism’s defense is to recall my previous discussion of the 
distinctness of mobility and impenetrability.  I argued that mobility should not be treated as a 
distinct power of bodies. Rather, the power of mobility is nothing over and above the 
power(s) of moving in certain ways.  Since impenetrability is conceived by Newton as a 
power of moving in accord with laws of motion governing impact, the power of mobility is 
(in part, if body has other distinct powers) nothing over and above the power of 
impenetrability. Thus, mobility and impenetrability—at least in the context of De 
Gravitatione’s creation story—are not really distinct powers.  We reduce two apparently 
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different powers to one power, characterized by the laws of motion pertaining to impact.  
Another quality on the lists above, the extension of bodies is straightforwardly accounted for 
under this interpretation: it is, the determination of space occupied by the power of 
impenetrability.  So, extension, mobility and impenetrability can be understood, in the 
context of De Gravitatione creation story, as one power instantiated space. 
 De Gravitatione does not discuss two other qualities which appear on Newton’s later 
lists.  Firstly, while it mentions resistance to motion of other bodies this power isn’t 
thoroughly discussed in the same context as the creation story.  It is therfore harder to 
determine Newton’s thoughts in De Gravitatione on how this power relates to the power 
impenetrability.  Secondly, hardness is not addressed at all in De Gravitatione as a power of 
body.  Nevertheless, Newton makes clear in later works that hardness is a power in the sense 
I have developed: it is relevant to the motion of bodies.  Here is how Newton takes the 
degree of hardness to be relevant to the motions of bodies in Query 31: “If they have so 
much elasticity as suffices to make them rebound with a quarter or half or three quarters of 
the force with which they come together, they will lose three quarters, or half, or a quarter of 
their motion” (Newton, 135).  Even the extremes of elasticity are understood in terms of 
rebound motion: “For bodies which are either absolutely hard, or so soft to be void of 
elasticity, will not rebound from one another” (Newton, 135). Clearly then, the hardness and 
elasticity of a body are relevant to determining motions and so appear to be, by my account 
of substance-making powers, powers of bodies.   
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 At the very least, then, it looks like body has three powers in Newton’s later thought 
which are not (wholly) present in De Gravitatione: impenetrability, hardness, and inertia.19  The 
plausibility of minimalism, however, depends on reducing these three powers to one since 
Newton clearly treats these as powers of body.  In what follows I will suggest a way in which 
these three powers can be understood as one, just as impenetrability and mobility are only 
apparently two in De Gravitatione.  
 We can start with inertia to see how to re-integrate inertia and impenetrability.  
Impenetrability, I suggested, should be understood as determined by the laws governing the 
changes in motion bodies create in one another through contact.  It seems fairly clear that by 
the Principia the inertial power is at the heart of explaining these motions. Of course, it 
explains more as well—for example, the orbits of objects acted on by centripetal forces—
but it also clearly is central to how bodies affect each others’ movements when they run into 
one another (given that no substances of the same kind can occupy the same place at the 
same time).  The power of impenetrability, that is, the power characterized by laws 
governing impact, can be understood as the operation of inertial power, since the laws of 
reflection follow from the laws of motion given at the beginning of the Principia and 
characterize the power of inertia.20 
 The next power to be addressed is hardness.  As noted above, Newton clearly thinks 
hardness is relevant to determining the motions of body and so a power in the sense relevant 
to substance.  So, we must ask what sense we can make of hardness when it comes to the 
‘least parts of matter’, the ‘material particles’ since the lists on which hardness appears 
                                                
19 In the objections below, I will return to the power that plays a prominent role in De 
Gravitatione but which I have not addressed yet: interactivity with mind. 
20 The Principia’s three laws of motion and their discussion are relevant texts here. 
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among the qualities of body concern atomic bodies.   It seems to me that the hardness of 
these particles should not be understood in contrast to softness or malleability but rather 
with elasticity.21  Consider in full the passage above from Query 31 in which Newton 
discusses the relevance of hardness, softness and elasticity to motion: “For bodies which are 
either absolutely hard, or so soft as to be void of elasticity, will not rebound from one 
another.  Impenetrability makes them only stop.  If two equal bodies meet directly in a 
vacuum, they will by the laws of motion stop where they meet and lose all their motion, and 
remain in rest, unless they be elastic” (Newton, 135).  In this discussion of body’s hardness it 
is clear that hardness is opposed to elasticity in the sense that absolutely hard bodies’ 
motions are determined fully by the laws of motion tied to inertia and impenetrability. What 
I suggest, then, is that we understand the hardness of material substances in contrast to 
elasticity. Other considerations count in favor of this view: the softness of non-atomic 
bodies is easy to understand in terms of their malleability, their shapes may be changed by a 
re-arrangement of their atomic components.  When it comes to atomic material particles a 
change in shape seems more difficult, if not impossible, to grasp.22   
If, as the texts suggest, we take the substance-making powers of body to be the 
powers possessed by atoms then the hardness of body must be understood in contrast with 
elasticity.  If the hardness of a body is its perfect inelasticity however, we can 
straightforwardly assimilate hardness to the inertial power.  As the passage cited above (‘If 
                                                
21 Taken on its own, outside of the context of the discussion of elasticity the following 
passage from Query 31 Newton might seem problematic for my interpretation since it seems 
to treat hardness in terms of not being able to be broken or worn down: “these primitive 
particles being solids, are incomparably harder than any porous bodies compounded of 
them; even so very hard, as never to wear or break in pieces: no ordinary power being able 
to divide what God himself made one in the first creation” (Newton 136-7).   
22 As the previous footnote suggests, the text isn’t perfectly in line with my interpretation. 
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two equal bodies meet directly in a vacuum, they will by the laws of motion stop where they 
meet and lose all their motion, and remain in rest, unless they be elastic’) suggests, the 
elasticity of bodies is a matter of their impact-determined motion differing from what it 
would be if only inertial forces were at work (abstracting away from, eg, attractive forces like 
gravity).  The hardness of body is its non-elasticity, which is no power in itself but instead 
determination of impact motions by inertial force.  If anything, the hardness of body is best 
conceived not as a power at all but an absence, an absence of elasticity such that the powers 
characterized by the laws of reflection fully determine the impact motions of bodies. 
ii.  Additional objections 
Accepting these suggestions for understanding the powers of impenetrability and 
hardness as indentical with the power of inertia allows for the claim that there is ultimately 
one power constitutive of body and it is characterized and known by us through the laws of 
motion that characterize the inertial power.  There are not really a multitude of powers to be 
tied together, but ultimately only one power which occupies a determined region of space 
and changes place in accord with the laws which characterize that power.  Even if we go this 
far several questions may remain, the most pressing of which comes from remembering the 
mind-interactivity power that Newton put to so much anti-Cartesian work in De Gravitatione.  
How are we to understand how this power, which pretty clearly won’t be able to be 
identified with the vis inertiae, as part of the same thing as that power?  Here I think I it is 
best to bracket the issue under the general heading of difficulties surrounding the mind-body 
problem. We can gain worthwhile insight into Newton’s conception of substance by setting 
this particular issue aside. 
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A second objection may be made to my approach more generally and is rooted in 
what appears to be at least an epistemic modesty about and perhaps a full-blown skepticism 
about substance. Consider a fuller quotation of a passage we have already examined from the 
General Scholium.  In the context of discussing our knowledge of God, Newton makes the 
following claim: “We see only the shapes and colors of bodies, we hear only their sounds, we 
touch only their external surfaces, we smell only their odors, and we taste their flavors.  But 
there is no direct sense and there are no indirect reflected actions by which we know 
innermost substances; much less do we have an idea of the substance of God” (Newton, 91).  
This certainly echoes the claims prefatory to De Gravitatione’s creation story in which Newton 
offers the hedge that what he describes is something that would appear, as far as we could 
tell, to be body but actual body may have some other nature and be constituted by some 
other powers than those he names but which produce the same phenomena, that is, motions 
(Newton, 27).  Furthermore, since I argued earlier that Stein’s interpretation of Newton’s 
epistemic modesty was incorrect, I might be expected to offer my own account rooted in my 
interpretation of Newton’s conception of substance. 
In response, note that on my interpretation our grasp of substance is only as good as 
the laws by which we characterize powers.  Thus, insofar as there is any inadequacy of our 
laws to the phenomena from which they are derived and which they are supposed to explain, 
we have room to resist the claim to a complete grasp of the substance.  Moreover, since our 
grasp of substance is by way of laws which characterize the substance-making powers, 
Newton’s metaphysics remains as open as the natural philosophy that informs it.  So, where 
there are powers that aren’t understood as the operation of some others, we have reason to 
take there to be multiple substances on Newton’s view.  Thus, the epistemic modesty 
articulated by Newton with respect to gravity and substance more general, is that we do not 
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know whether further accounts of the activities characterized by these laws—and so 
differently characterized powers, and so different substances—will be forthcoming.  As a 
result, though the conception of substances stays constant, what substances and how many 
substances there are is as open to empirical revision as the natural philosophy that informs 
our grasp of substance-making powers. 
Finally, recalling the Lockean nature of the interpretation I have offered reveals a 
deeper response to this objection.  For Locke our grasp of substance penetrates no further 
than their appearances.  In Locke’s case, this means that our grasp of substance cannot 
penetrate beyond the powers to produce certain ideas in us.  I have argued above that the 
same general picture holds for Newton.  The difference is that the appearances in question 
for Newton are the motions of bodies.  Nevertheless, our grasp of substance is still limited 
to the powers to produce such motions.  We have no knowledge of the power independent 
of its effect on the motions of bodies, and so our knowledge of substance does not 
ultimately penetrate beyond its appearances.   
IV.  Conclusion 
 To close I would like to compare the picture of Newtonian substance I have 
developed here with other recent work on Newton’s conception of substance, Kochiras 
(forthcoming).  Kochiras argues, on grounds similar to those seen here, that Newton has 
what she calls a substance counting problem.  Newton has an insuperable difficulty, 
according to Kochiras, in explicating how we can come to infer substances from observed 
properties (or powers).  Kochiras highlights three dimensions of Newton’s thought on 
substance.  First, as we have seen, Newton allows that different kinds of substances may 
occupy the same place.  Second, as we have also seen to some degree, our knowledge of 
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substance is highly empirical for Newton in that our only access to substance is through the 
appearance of motions.23  As a result, our knowledge of substances is as open and fluid as 
the natural philosophy that informs it.   Finally, despite his empiricist commitments, Newton 
is also committed, on what look to be non-empirical grounds, to certain metaphysical 
principles; most notably, that nothing can act distantly.  Given the empirical difficulties of 
isolating an immaterial substance, Kochiras argues, it doesn’t seem that we could ever be in a 
position to empirically determine whether some property or power belonged to one 
substance or another.  Or, indeed, whether a substance can be inferred at all from a property 
or power.  She gives the following example: to determine whether or not air is responsible 
for the free fall of objects towards the earth, we can drop an object in a vacuum chamber.  
No such experiment, however, is possible when it comes to determining whether an 
immaterial substance may be responsible for the fall since there is nothing like a vacuum 
chamber when it comes to an immaterial substance; any material chamber would be 
permeable by the immaterial substance since different kinds of substances can occupy the 
same place.   
Given these strains in Newton’s thought about substance, Kochiras points out the 
following problem: there is no way to infer from properties or powers to substances for 
Newton and so no way to tell how many substances there are in any place at a time. Other 
powers besides gravity—exothermic reactions, electricity, magnetism—pose the same 
problems.  Indeed, the epistemological problems of knowing what substances to infer from 
which powers and which powers to assign to which substances in such cases may be worse 
                                                
23 Kochiras pushes this point further than I have here and argues that for Newton even God 
is only known through His appearance, ‘phenomena’, in creation (creation is the appearance 
of God). 
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because unlike gravity it isn’t even clear what grounds Newton has to treat them as 
secondary powers rather than as God’s own action (Kochiras, xx).  Moreover, as I have 
argued here, a spatial criterion won’t help for individuating substances even if we allow 
Newton an a priori division between mind and matter: individuation, or power unification, 
by co-location can’t be reconciled with Newton’s commitment to local action.  
 The chief difference between the conception of substance I have argued for here and 
that which Kochiras claims is at the heart of Newton’s substance counting problem is that 
on my interpretation power exhausts substance.  As a result, there is nothing in our thought 
over and above thought of powers on Newton’s view.  This Lockean approach to substance 
transforms Kochiras’ substance counting problem into what I have called the power 
unification problem as the question of inferring substance from powers is ultimately a 
question of uniting powers.  Stein argues that a consequence of Newton’s Lockeanism is that 
Newton has open to him only a spatial criterion of unification: multiple powers are united 
into one thing by virtue of their co-location in space (supplemented by an a priori dualism 
about mind and body).  I have argued, however, that a spatial criterion of individuation and 
unification cannot be reconciled with Newton’s commitment to local action.  Consequently, 
the only way in which powers are unified into a single substance is by being identified as a 
single power: the only criterion of substantial unity is the identity of powers. Since power 
exhausts our thought of substance, there is nothing but powers to account for the unity of 
powers into a single substance, not even space. That is, the unity of powers can only be 
understood as the identity of powers by showing that one power is nothing but the 
operation of some other.  The challenge of inferring substances from powers is then a 
problem of determining the different distinctions that can be drawn between powers.  To 
reconcile this claim with Newton’s texts I have argued above that all of the powers of body 
 37 
Newton lists in his later works can indeed be understood as identical with the power of 
inertia as characterized by the Principia’s three laws of motion.  In the end, then, a substance 
can have only one power for Newton.  Thus, distinct powers such as gravity and inertia 
constitute distinct substances in Newton’s metaphysics.24 
                                                
24 Again, Newton takes these substances to be shown to be distinct in the Principia (See 
Janiak (2007) and the General Scholium).  Presumably Newton thinks other powers of to 
Newton, electricity, magnetism, exothermic reactions, can also be distinguished from either 
of these, but none have been shown to be distinct as the Principia shows the gravitational and 
inertial forces to be distinct. 
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